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Insurance
by Stephen M. Schatz*
Stephen L. Cotter"
and Bradley S. WolffC"
I.

INTRODUCTION

What constitutes an "occurrence," as defined by a commercial general
liability policy, was again a significant focus of the appellate courts
during the survey year.' The Georgia Supreme Court finally resolved
opposite positions taken by federal courts and state courts in Georgia,
deciding that negligent faulty workmanship by a contractor resulting in
damage to other property constitutes an occurrence.2 However, when
an insured acts negligently, but with foresight, expectation, or design,
such conduct will not be a covered occurrence.? The Georgia Court of
Appeals also reinforced the correct legal standard to consider when
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1. For analysis of Georgia insurance law during the prior survey period, see Stephen
L. Cotter, Stephen M. Schatz & Bradley S. Wolff, Insurance, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 62 MERCER L. REV. 139 (2010).
2. See Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Hathaway Dev. Co., 288 Ga. 749, 752, 707
S.E.2d 369, 372 (2011).
3. Id.

165

166

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

deciding whether an insured is justified in failing to provide timely
notice of a claim to its insurer.
In the property insurance policy arena, the doctrines of implied waiver
and estoppel based upon the conduct of an insurer or agent generally
cannot create coverage under a policy where coverage does not otherwise
exist.5 Moreover, courts continue to show their propensity to enforce
policy language as clearly written, even if the insured contends such
enforcement is unfair under the circumstances. 6 Also, diminution of
value is not a recoverable loss under commercial property policies.' In
addition, an assignment of a claim cannot overcome a forfeiture of
coverage caused by the voluntary payment doctrine.' Moreover, suit
limitation clauses that are not less than two years are enforced and are
not extended to the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract
claims.' Lastly, a policy of title insurance covers a forged deed."o
With respect to auto insurance policies, a liability carrier's payment
of a hospital lien does not reduce the limit of liability available to pay an
uninsured motorist claim." Courts remain split on whether an insurer
must offer uninsured motorist coverage when doing so would conflict
with sovereign immunity or with specific limitations of a statutorilycreated insurance company." The lack of timely notice defense is
available to an automobile insurer when the insured does not provide
notice, even though the carrier is aware of the accident through other
sources."a A renter of a vehicle who violates the rental agreement may

4. See Forshee v. Emp'rs Mut. Cas. Co., 309 Ga. App. 621, 626, 711 S.E.2d 28, 33
(2011).
5. Mahens v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 1:10-CV-174-TWT, 2011 WL 1321578, at *4 (N.D.
Ga. Apr. 1, 2011).
6. See Thornton v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut., 287 Ga. 379, 382, 695 S.E.2d 642, 645
(2010).
7. Royal Capital Dev., LLC v. Md. Cas. Co., No. 1:10-CV-1275-RLV, 2010 WL 5105157,
at *3 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 2, 2010).
8. S. Mut. Church Ins. Co. v. ARS Mech., LLC, 306 Ga. App. 748, 753, 703 S.E.2d 363,
367 (2010).
9. Jenkins v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. CV 110-043, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
31393, at *14-15 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2011).
10. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Keyingham Invs., LLC, 288 Ga. 312, 312, 702 S.E.2d
851, 852 (2010).
11. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Adams, 288 Ga. 315, 318-19, 702 S.E.2d 898,90102 (2010).
12. Compare Ga. Interlocal Risk Mgmt. Agency v. Godfrey, 305 Ga. App. 130, 134, 699
S.E.2d 377, 379 (2010), with VHF Captive Ins. Co. v. Pleitez, 307 Ga. App. 240, 242-43, 704
S.E.2d 476, 479 (2010).
13. Lankford v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 307 Ga. App. 12, 15-16, 703 S.E.2d 436,
440 (2010).
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forfeit coverage provided by the rental company." Finally, in several
factually diverse cases, courts addressed whether a driver who causes an
accident qualifies as a permissive user thereby entitling the driver to
coverage under an automobile liability policy."
II.

COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY POLICIES

A.

"Occurrence"in Construction Defect Cases
As highlighted in last year's survey, over the last several years federal
and state courts in Georgia have been reaching seemingly opposite
conclusions in interpreting what constitutes an "occurrence" under a
commercial general liability (CGL) policy in construction defect cases
where an insured's faulty workmanship allegedly causes damages."
Federal courts have taken the position that such damages do not
constitute an occurrence because the allegedly defective work was not an
accident, but rather an injury "accidently caused by intentional acts.""
Georgia courts have held that if negligent construction is alleged, then
the negligent conduct constitutes an accident and is therefore an
occurrence. 18
The Georgia Supreme Court has now addressed the issue in American
Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Co. v. Hathaway Development Co.'"
Hathaway Development Co. (Hathaway), a general contractor, sued its
plumbing subcontractor, Whisnant Contracting Co. (Whisnant), for
allegedly negligent work performed on three projects.20 On one project,
Whisnant failed to install the correct size pipe as specified in the
contract. On another project, Whisnant incorrectly installed a dishwasher supply line. On a third project, Whisnant improperly installed a pipe

14. See Hix v. Hertz, 307 Ga. App. 369, 369, 705 S.E.2d 219, 220 (2010).
15. See Clayton v. S. Gen. Ins. Co., 306 Ga. App. 394, 394, 702 S.E.2d 446, 448 (2010);
Conklin v. Acceptance Indem. Ins. Co. 306 Ga. App. 585, 587, 702 S.E.2d 727, 729 (2010).
16. See Cotter et al., supra note 1, at 164, 166.
17. Hathaway Dev. Co. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 274 F. App'x 787, 791 (11th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Owners Ins. Co. v. James, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2003)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). For a discussion of the decision in James, see Stephen M.
Schatz et al., Insurance, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 56 MERCER L. REV. 253, 260-62
(2004).
18. See, e.g., Custom Planning & Dev., Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 270 Ga. App. 8,
10, 606 S.E.2d 39, 41 (2004) (citing SawHorse, Inc. v. S. Guar. Ins. Co., 269 Ga. App. 493,
498-99, 604 S.E.2d 541, 546 (2004)). For a discussion of the decision in SawHorse, see
Stephen M. Schatz et al., Insurance,Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 57 MERCER L. REV.
221, 230-32 (2005).
19. 288 Ga. 749, 707 S.E.2d 369 (2011).
20. Id. at 750, 707 S.E.2d at 370.
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that later became detached under hydrostatic pressure.2 1 It is important to note that each of these acts or omissions caused damage to other
adjacent property being built by Hathaway.22
Whisnant's insurer, American Empire Surplus Lines, denied coverage
under its CGL policy on the basis that the negligent workmanship was
not an occurrence." The policy defined occurrence as "an accident,
including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same,
general harmful conditions."2 4 The trial court found that the claims
against Whisnant were not an accident as contemplated by the policy
and granted summary judgment to the insurer. The court of appeals
reversed, holding that Whisnant's acts were occurrences because
Whisnant's negligent workmanship caused damage to surrounding
properties. 25
The supreme court analyzed the definition of accident set forth in
26
and Georgia case law, and confirmed that an
Black's Law Dictionary
accident is "an unexpected happening rather than one occurring through
intention or design." 27 Accordingly, the court held that an occurrence
can arise "where faulty workmanship causes unforeseen or unexpected
damage to other property."28 Such is true even though Whisnant's
negligent workmanship was performed intentionally. 29 "[A] deliberate
act, performed negligently, is an accident if the effect is not the intended
or expected result; that is, the result would have been different had the
Therefore, the supreme
deliberate act been performed correctly.""o
court upheld the court of appeals reversal of summary judgment for the
insurer."
In his dissent, Justice Melton followed the rationale of the federal
court cases. 3 2 Because Whisnant's plumbing work was done intentionally, it could not be an accident.33 Relying upon the plain language of

21. Id. at 752, 707 S.E.2d at 371-72.
22. Id. at 750, 707 S.E.2d at 370.
23. Id.
24. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Id.
26. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 16 (9th ed. 2009).
27. Am. Empire, 288 Ga. at 751, 707 S.E.2d at 371 (quoting City of Atlanta v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 231 Ga. App. 206, 208, 498 S.E.2d 782, 784 (1998)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
28. Id. at 752, 707 S.E.2d at 372.
29. Id.
30. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lamar Homes v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242
S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 752-53, 707 S.E.2d at 372 (Melton, J., dissenting).

33. Id. at 753, 707 S.E.2d at 372.
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the policy, coverage for an occurrence would only be provided "for injury
resultingfrom accidental acts, but not for an injury accidentallycaused
by intentional acts."34 Justice Melton believed the majority's opinion
"improperly stretched the meaning of the insurance policy language
beyond the plain terms of the agreement to include insurance against
negligent acts as well.""
American Empire resolved the issue of whether negligent construction
that causes damage to other property constitutes an occurrence under a
Presumably, federal courts in Georgia will begin
CGL policy."
following this position, despite prior decisions to the contrary." The
supreme court, though, leaves two important questions unanswered.
First, what if the faulty workmanship gave rise to breach of contract or
breach of warranty claims instead of a negligence claim? Does a breach
of contract or breach of warranty claim arising out of faulty workmanship constitute an occurrence? The court of appeals has consistently
found that breach of contract and breach of warranty claims are not
occurrences.38 In a case decided after American Empire, the court of
appeals reinforced that breach of warranty claims and breach of contract
claims are not considered covered occurrences."
Second, if the contractor's faulty workmanship does not cause damage
to other property, but only to the contractor's own work, does such
damage constitute an occurrence? The court of appeals has issued
inconsistent rulings on whether an occurrence applies only to resulting
damage to other property arising out of the faulty workmanship.4 0 It
remains to be seen how subsequent decisions rely upon American Empire

to answer these questions. Forster v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co."
provides the first hint. The court of appeals focused on the damage to

34. Id. (quoting James, 295 F. Supp. at 1364) (internal quotation marks omitted).
35.

Id.

36. See id. at 752, 707 S.E.2d at 372.
37. See, e.g., Hathaway Dev. Co., 274 F. App'x at 791; State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Diner Concepts, Inc., 370 F. App'x 56, 58 (11th Cir. 2010); Burt Co. v. Clarendon Nat'l Ins.
Co., 385 F. App'x 892, 894 (11th Cir. 2010).
38.

See, e.g., Custom Planning & Dev., 270 Ga. App. at 10, 606 S.E.2d at 41. For a

discussion of this decision, see Schatz et al., supra note 18, at 232.
39. See Forster v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 307 Ga. App. 89, 92, 704 S.E.2d 204, 206
(2010).
40. Compare SawHorse, 269 Ga. App. at 498-99, 604 S.E.2d at 546, with QBE Ins. Co.
v. Couch Pipeline & Grading, Inc., 303 Ga. App. 196, 199, 692 S.E.2d 795, 797 (2010). It
should be noted that even if faulty workmanship that does not cause damage to other
property is found to be an occurrence, such faulty workmanship is typically excluded under
the "business risk" exclusions of a CGL policy. See Sapp v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
226 Ga. App. 200, 203-04, 486 S.E.2d 71, 74-75 (1997).
41. 307 Ga. App. 89, 704 S.E.2d 204 (2010).
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other property requirement when it stated that the insurer "would have
the obligation to provide coverage to the extent that any defects in the
contractual work incidentally damaged other property not included in
the construction project.'A2
"Occurrence"in a Wrongful Death Case
Under a different factual scenario, in Rucker v. Columbia National
Insurance Co.,4* the court of appeals addressed the interpretation of an
occurrence in a liability policy." Anthony Rucker sued Jefferson Taylor
for wrongful death on the grounds that Taylor negligently failed to
conduct a criminal background check on a service technician that Taylor
hired to repair appliances at Rucker's home. While at the home, the
service technician killed Rucker's wife and kidnapped his son. Had
Taylor performed a criminal background check it would have revealed
the service technician's history of violent crime.4 5 During discovery,
Taylor testified that he did not perform a criminal background check on
the service technician because he was a trainee, and he never performed
such checks on trainees until he knew he would hire them on a
permanent basis."
Similar to the policy in American Empire, Taylor's liability policy with
Columbia defined occurrence as "an accident, including continuous or
repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions."' And like American Empire, the court stated that "an accident
is an unexpected happening rather than one occurring through intention
or design."" The question of whether an act was without the insured's
foresight, expectation, or design is asked from the insured's point of
view. 4 9 In holding that no covered occurrence had been alleged, the
court focused on the fact that Taylor intended to forego performing a
criminal background check; therefore, such conduct took place with
Taylor's foresight, expectation, or design.so
Compare the holding of Rucker to the holding of American Empire.
Both addressed allegedly negligent conduct by the insured." In both,
B.

42. Id. at 92, 704 S.E.2d at 206.
43. 307 Ga. App. 444, 705 S.E.2d 270 (2010).
44. Id. at 444, 705 S.E.2d at 271.

45. Id. at 444-45, 705 S.E.2d at 272.
46. Id. at 448, 705 S.E.2d at 274.
47. Id. at 445, 705 S.E.2d at 272 (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. Id. at 447, 705 S.E.2d at 273.
49. Id. at 447, 705 S.E.2d at 273-74.
50. Id. at 448, 705 S.E.2d at 274.
51. See Am. Empire, 288 Ga. at 750, 707 S.E.2d at 370; Rucker, 307 Ga. App. at 444-45,
705 S.E.2d at 271-72.
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the courts focused on whether the conduct of the insured was accidental
or intentional (from the insured's viewpoint), and not on whether the
resulting injury or damage was accidental or intentional.12 In American Empire, the plumbing contractor's negligent workmanship was
accidental-even though the contractor intended to do the plumbing work,
he did not intend to do the work negligently." In Rucker, the insured
did intend to do the negligent work because he had a policy of never
performing a criminal background check for a service technician trainee;
thus, his negligent conduct was deliberate and by design."
Timely Notice of Claim
Nearly every year, we write about a recent appellate court decision
addressing the condition in a CGL policy requiring the insured to
provide its insurer with timely notice of an occurrence, claim, or
lawsuit-and this year is no different.
In Forshee v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co.," a woman fell in the
parking lot of the insureds' gas station in November 2007. One of the
owners of the gas station witnessed the woman on the ground and asked
her if she needed any medical assistance, but the woman refused. The
woman may have mentioned that she hurt her arm, but stated that she
intended to go home. The insureds did not know the identity of the
woman nor did they have any information that would allow them to
determine her identity. The insureds never heard from the woman until
nearly two years later when she filed suit. The insureds then gave
immediate notice of the lawsuit to their insurer. 6
The insurer filed a declaratory judgment action, contending that the
insureds breached the notice condition of the policy by failing to provide
timely notice of the occurrence, and, therefore, the insurer owed no
coverage or defense to the insureds. As it turned out, the woman who
fell broke her arm and was admitted to the hospital on the date of the
fall." In granting summary judgment in favor of the insurer, the trial
court focused on the severity of the injury and found that the incident
was sufficiently significant to have required the insureds to report any
information they had regarding the incident to their insurer.
C.

52. See Am. Empire, 288 Ga. at 752, 707 S.E.2d at 372; Rucker, 307 Ga. App. at 447,
705 S.E.2d at 273.
53. Am. Empire, 288 Ga. App. at 752, 707 S.E.2d at 372.
54. Rucker, 307 Ga. App. at 448, 705 S.E.2d at 274.
55. 309 Ga. App. 621, 711 S.E.2d 28 (2011).
56. Id. at 621-22, 711 S.E.2d at 30.
57. Id. at 621-22, 711 S.E.2d at 29-30.
58. Id. at 624-25, 711 S.E.2d at 32.
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The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court applied the
wrong legal standard." The correct legal standard to apply in determining whether an insured must give notice of an occurrence is to assess
an insured's failure to give notice from "the perspective of a reasonable
person in the circumstances in which the linsureds] found themselves,
not that of an omniscient being having the benefit of full and accurate
information that emerged only later and [with] the benefit of hindsight."6o Further, "an insured is not 'required to foresee every possible
claim, no matter how remote,' that might arise from an event and give
notice of it to his insurer. Instead, the law only requires an insured 'to
act reasonably under the circumstances.'" Finally, the court of appeals
explained: "[Ilt is the nature and circumstances of 'the accident' or 'the
incident' and the immediate conclusions an ordinarily prudent and
reasonable person would draw therefrom that determine whether an
insured has reasonably justified his decision not to notify the insurer." 2
The court of appeals criticized the trial court's failure "to eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight when it based its reasonableness
determination on how severe the injury turned out to be, rather than
how severe it would have appeared to a reasonable person in the position
The court remanded the case to the trial court to
of the [insureds].'
determine, using the correct legal standard, whether the insureds'
failure to provide timely notice of the incident was reasonable under the
circumstances."
The court in Forshee did not create new law, but it did reinforce the
importance of using the correct legal standard when judging the
reasonableness of an insured's failure to provide timely notice of an
occurrence. If an insured knew or should have known at the time of an
occurrence that an incident merited being reported to its insurer in a
timely fashion, then the insured must provide timely notice or coverage
may be forfeited." But if an insured had no reasonable basis to think
that an incident would be grounds for a possible claim, then the
insured's failure to provide timely notice may be justified. This is a
common sense approach because it would be unreasonable to require an

59. Id. at 626, 711 S.E.2d at 33.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 623, 711 S.E.2d at 31 (quoting Guar. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Brock, 222 Ga. App.
294, 295, 474 S.E.2d 46, 48 (1996)).

62. Id. at 624, 711 S.E.2d at 31 (quoting S. Guar. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 183 Ga. App. 261,
263, 358 S.E.2d 611, 612 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Id. at 625-26, 711 S.E.2d at 32.
64. Id. at 626, 711 S.E.2d at 33.
65. See id. at 623, 711 S.E.2d at 31.

66. See id.
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insured to report every minor or trivial mishap, regardless of whether
that mishap eventually turned out to be much more serious.
Contrast Forsheewith the decision by the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia in Illinois Union Insurance Co. v.
Sierra Contracting Corp.,67 also decided during the survey year. In
Illinois Union Insurance, the insured was a contractor who built a
residential condominium project. Water intrusion problems and leaks
were reported to the insured almost immediately upon construction and
continued for the next year and a half before the insured finally gave
notice to its CGL carrier." Giving the insured all possible inferences
in its favor, the court determined that the almost nine-month delay in
giving notice was unreasonable as a matter of law.6" Because the
insured did not offer any justification for its delay in providing notice of
the water intrusion, the court held that the delay violated the policy
condition that the insured provide notice "as soon as practicable."O

D.

Coverage for Treble Damages
In Alea London, Ltd. v. American Home Services, Inc.," the insured

was sued for violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
(TCPA)" by sending unsolicited faxes.7 ' The TCPA permits an award
of treble damages for each violation if the violation was willful or
knowing."
Violation of the TCPA was covered under the insured's
CGL policy as an "advertising injury."" The insurer that issued the
CGL policy brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration
that treble damages were not covered pursuant to the exclusion for
punitive and exemplary damages in the policy.76 The exclusion did not
And the TCPA does not
define punitive or exemplary damages.7
identify whether treble damages are considered compensatory or

67.
68.
69.
70.

744 F. Supp. 2d 1349 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
Id. at 1350.
Id. at 1352-53.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

71.
72.

638 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2011).
47 U.S.C. § 227 (2006).

73.

Alea London, 638 F.3d at 771-72.

74. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).
75. Alea London, 638 F.3d at 772. For a discussion of how a violation of the TCPA
constitutes a covered advertising injury, see Hooters of Augusta v. American Global
Insurance Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1371-72 (S.D. Ga. 2003). See also Schatz et al., supra
note 17, at 258-60.
76. Alea London, 638 F.3d at 772.
77. Id. at 776.
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punitive in nature.7 ' The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that treble damages were compensatory for the
purpose of deciding whether they were covered under the CGL policy or
excluded by the punitive damages exclusion."
In reaching its conclusion, the court held that the punitive damages
exclusion was ambiguous, thereby requiring the court to interpret the
language in favor of coverage, pursuant to the rules of insurance
contract construction in Georgia." The court noted that if the insurer
intended to exclude treble damages, then it could have drafted the
exclusion accordingly to clear up any ambiguity." It remains to be
seen whether courts will apply the rationale of Alea London to other
types of statutory damages, such as a violation of the Clean Water
the Anticybersquatting
Act,8 2 the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
Consumer Protection Act,84 the Lanham Act (addressing trademarks)," or other similar laws.
III. HOmIEOWNER'S INSURANCE
In Holloway v. Travelers Indemnity Co.," the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia rejected another attempt by
an insured to personally sue employees of a carrier for the carrier's
alleged failure to deliver contractual benefits.' Here, the plaintiff sued
the insured after a slip and fall at the insured's home, and the insured
allowed the matter to go into default before submitting it to Travelers
Indemnity Company (Travelers), the insured's homeowner's insurance
carrier. The submission was met by a reservation of rights letter and
later transmitted to in-house counsel. Travelers had several interactions
with the insured, but, ultimately, in-house counsel refrained from

78. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).
79. Alea London, 638 F.3d at 779.
80. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2(5) (2010) ("If the construction is doubtful, that which goes
most strongly against the party executing the instrument or undertaking the obligation is
generally to be preferred.").
81. Alea London, 638 F.3d at 779.
82. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
83. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2006).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006).
85. 15 U.S.C. ch. 22 (2006).
86. For CGL policies that do not contain a punitive damages exclusion, it is well
established in Georgia that if the underlying cause of action upon which punitive damages
are assessed is covered under the policy, then the punitive damages are also covered. See
Lunceford v. Peachtree Cas. Ins. Co., 230 Ga. App. 4, 9, 495 S.E.2d 88, 92 (1997).
87. 761 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
88. Id. at 1373-74.
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representing the insured. The insured then sued not only Travelers but
also the claim and in-house counsel personnel for a number of causes of
The court
action, all emanating from the insurance relationship."
determined that the individual defendants were fraudulently joined, and,
90
hence, complete diversity of citizenship existed. In so doing, the court
reiterated the substantive rule that, where there are no allegations that
the employees did anything other than function within the scope of their
employment, "[it is well settled that mere failure to perform a contract
does not constitute a tort. A plaintiff in a breach of contract case has a
tort claim only where, in addition to breaching the contract, the
defendant also breaches an independent duty imposed by law."" This
holding is consistent with others that uphold complete diversity of
citizenship and non-liability of insurance employees for the contractual
commitments of their employers.
Several recent cases rejected insureds' attempts to avoid policy
provisions plainly appearing in their policies. In Mahens v. Allstate
Insurance Co.,92 Mahens was never a resident of the property that he
bought and claimed was his home. The property suffered a water
leak.93 Mahens insurance coverage was expressly limited to "where
[he] resideld] and which [was] principally used as a private residence,"
neither of which conditions were satisfied.9 4 The insured argued
doctrines of implied waiver and estoppel against the carrier because the
carrier had initially agreed to pay for repair work and later attempted
to settle." The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia rejected this argument because "[tihe doctrines of implied
waiver and estoppel, based upon the conduct or action of the insurer, or
its agent, are not available to bring within the coverage of a policy risks
not covered by its terms, or risks expressly excluded therefrom.""
Hence, while conditions and exclusions may be forfeited by a carrier,
implied waiver or estoppel coverage cannot affirmatively be created by
97
the conduct of an insurer.

89. Id. at 1372-73.
90. Id. at 1374-75.
91. Id. at 1374 (emphasis added) (quoting USF Corp. v. Securitas Sec. Serys. USA, Inc.,
305 Ga. App. 404, 408-09, 699 S.E.2d 554, 558 (2010)).
92. No. 1:10-CV-174-TWT, 2011 WL 1321578 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 1, 2011).
93. Id. at *1.
94. Id.
95. Id. at *4.
96. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Danforth v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 282 Ga. App.
421, 427, 638 S.E.2d 852, 858-59 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id.
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Similarly, in Thornton v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Co.,98 the supreme court rejected a homeowner's "injustice" argument." Here, the policy contained independent terms-one providing
a one-year time-to-sue clause and another providing a sixty-day loss
payment period.o The insured claimed that the latter tolled the
former. However, no such provision appeared in the policy. The insured
went on to argue that the one-year time-to-sue clause should be tolled
due to unfairness that would otherwise result.'0 ' The court disagreed
with out-of-state precedent that seemed to rewrite insurance policies to
get a "fair resolution," noting that the court needs to enforce the policies
as written rather than "making policy calls that are properly left to
individual parties drafting their contracts and to the General Assembly
and the Insurance Commissioner in establishing the standard policy." 0 2
Lastly, in Jenkins v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 03
the court considered a creative argument to the effect that where the
face of a homeowner's policy provided a one-year time-to-sue clause and
Georgia law allowed a minimum two-year time-to-sue clause, the suit
limitation was void, and the six-year statute of limitations applied.'o
The court ultimately ordered reformation of the homeowner's policy to
provide for a two-year time-to-sue clause, which is mandated under
Georgia law." The court relied on Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v.
Dean'0 in reaching its holding.'
The court in Dean ruled that the
"insurance contract must be reformed to conform with the minimum
coverage provided in the Standard Fire Policy."'o That being the case,
Allstate's non-conforming policy was reformed to conform to the
minimum two-year contractual suit limitation mandated in the Standard

98. 287 Ga. 379, 695 S.E.2d 642 (2010).
99. Id. at 382, 695 S.E.2d at 645.
100. Id. at 380, 695 S.E.2d at 643.
101. Id. at 383, 695 S.E.2d at 645.
102. Id. at 384, 388, 695 S.E.2d at 646, 648 (quoting Peloso v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
267 A.2d 498, 501 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. No. CV 110-043, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31393 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2011).

104. Id. at *10.
105. Id. at *12-13; O.C.G.A. § 33-32-1(a) (2005) (stating that fire insurance policies
must "conformll . .. to all provisions and the sequence of the standard or uniform form
prescribed by the Commissioner. . ."); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 120-2-19-.01 (2006) (stating
that a plaintiff is entitled to bring suit against a fire insurance provider "within two ...
years" of the loss).
106. 212 Ga. App. 262, 441 S.E.2d 436 (1994).
107. Jenkins, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31393, at *10-11.
108. Dean, 212 Ga. App. at 265, 441 S.E.2d at 438.
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Fire Policy.o' Additionally, Allstate's policy specifically addressed a
remedy for such potential conflicts, "the [policy] provisions are amended
to conform to such [mandatory state] statutes." 0
IV.

PROPERTY INSURANCE

A commercial property insurer avoided a State Farm Mutual Auto
Insurance Co. v. Mabry"' d6j& vu in the context of alleged diminution
of value to non-automotive property."2 Here, the loss payment clause
explicitly provided the insured the option of paying either loss of value
or the cost of replacement."' The carrier selected the latter, thereby
invoking express policy language that precluded the coverage that the
State Farm policy in Mabry apparently left dangling."' This decision
is limited by the language contained in the policy."' It will be interesting to learn if other commercial property policies will be similarly
tested.
The need for careful handling and documentation was reinforced in
Southern Mutual Church Insurance Co. v. ARS Mechanical, LLC, 1 6
when a church's fire loss was paid, but under the documentation, neither
an effective assignment nor right to subrogation was created."' The
claims person paying this six-figure loss eventually testified that there
was no first-party coverage to begin with."' Hence, Southern Mutual
backed up, in the face of a "voluntary payment" defense, and claimed its
case against the allegedly responsible party (ARS) was really based on
an assignment.n'
However, the court of appeals did not entertain this argument,
especially since the carrier did not seek an assignment until well after
the loss.120 In short, when there is no basis for the assignment of a
claim, other than purported insurance coverage, and the carrier had no
insurance obligation to begin with, the carrier's attempt to recover from
another what it did not owe can be defended on the merits by reason of

109.

Jenkins, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31393, at *12-13.

110.

Id. at *13.

111. 274 Ga. 498, 556 S.E.2d 114 (2001).
112. See Royal Capital Dev., LLC v. Md. Cas. Co., No. 1:10-CV-1275-RLV, 2010 WL
5105157, at *2-3 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 2, 2010).
113. Id. at *1.
114. Compare id., with Mabry, 274 Ga. at 502-09, 556 S.E.2d at 118-23.
115. Royal Capital, 2010 WL 5105157, at *3.
116. 306 Ga. App. 748, 703 S.E.2d 363 (2010).
117. Id. at 748-49, 703 S.E.2d at 364.
118. Id. at 752, 703 S.E.2d at 366.
119. Id. at 751, 703 S.E.2d at 365.
120. Id. at 753-54, 703 S.E.2d at 367.
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the voluntary payment doctrine.121 This case evinces the importance
of proper documentation and the need to determine what is actually
owed on a given claim.122
In another two-year suit limitation case, Stone Mountain Collision
Center v. General Casualty Co.,' 23 yet another insured lost on a
two-year contractual suit limitation clause that plainly appeared in the
policy.'"' Significant history of negotiation over nearly two years did
not relieve this insured of the binding effect of the two-year suit
limitation clause.12 5 Despite back-and-forth offers and demands, the
court noted that the last communication concerning the November 2005
loss occurred in May 2007 and that the insured had a thirty-day time
limit for performance.12 6 The court enforced the limitation because
there was no specific evidentiary proof suggesting the insured was
fraudulently lulled into reasonably believing the suit limitation would
not be enforced. 127
"Collapse" was again considered in Mount Zion Baptist Church v.
GuideOne Elite Insurance Co.,128 and again, the precise policy language
controlled. 129 In this case, collapse was defined in the policy to mean:
the actual abrupt falling down or caving in of a building or any part of
a building with the result that the building or part of the building
cannot be occupied for its intended use ....

Moreover, a building that

is standing or any part of a building that is standing is not considered
to be in a state of collapse even if it shows evidence of cracking,
bulging, sagging, bending, leaning, settling, shirking, or expansion."s0
Unquestionably, the condition of the church, as demonstrated by the
factual and expert evidence, probably would have met the test for
collapse if the insurance policy did not define the term collapse, as was

the case in Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Tomlin."'
However, due to the Tomlin experience and its progeny carriers, such as

121. Id. at 753-54, 703 S.E.2d at 367-68.
122. Compare id., with Rabun & Assoc. Constr., Inc. v. Berry, 276 Ga. App. 485, 490,
623 S.E.2d 691, 696 (2005) (holding the insured was entitled to full loss payments from its
insurer and able to recover the entire loss from the responsible party, thereby legally
achieving a double recovery).
123. 307 Ga. App. 394, 705 S.E.2d 163 (2010).
124. See id. at 394, 705 S.E.2d at 164.
125. See id. at 394-95, 705 S.E.2d at 164.
126. Id. at 396-97, 705 S.E.2d at 165.
127. Id. at 397, 705 S.E.2d at 166.
128. No. 1:10-CV-609-RWS, 2011 WL 1497385 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 19, 2011).
129. Id. at *4.
130. Id. at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
131. 181 Ga. App. 413, 414, 352 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1986).
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GuideOne in this case, have tweaked their policies to expressly provide
what is and is not covered. 13 2
V. ERISA AND DISABILITY POLICIES
In Alcorn v. Appleton,' the court of appeals continued to draw the
fine line of preemption under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) 13 4 in its decision." In Alcorn, a divorce led to a settlement agreement between Alcorn and Appleton that gave each party the
right to choose a beneficiary of their own life insurance policies. Alcorn
died without designating a beneficiary for his 401(k) plan and left
Following
Appleton as a beneficiary of his life insurance policy.'
Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings & Investment
Plan,m"' proceeds were directly paid by the administrator to Appleton. 13" However, Kennedy did not decide whether the plan proceeds
after distribution by the ERISA plan administrator could be reached or
whether they were preempted by ERISA.as The court of appeals held
that ERISA preemption stops at the point the ERISA plan administrator
distributes the funds.14 0 Hence, the deceased's beneficiaries could
pursue the 401(k) and life insurance proceeds in the hands of Appleton.141
A pair of recent district court decisions reflect careful policing of
gamesmanship at the district court level. First, in Zorn v. PrincipalLife
Insurance Co., 142 the District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia wrestled with when and to what extent post-record discovery
would be allowed in conjunction with the court's conducting a de novo
review of the ERISA administrator's decision. 143 Usually, only the
administrative record is used.144 To make an exception, the applicant
for such discovery "must show a reasonable chance that the requested

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See Mount Zion Baptist Church, 2011 WL 1497385, at *3.
308 Ga. App. 663, 708 S.E.2d 390 (2011).
29 U.S.C. ch. 18 (2006).
Alcorn, 308 Ga. App. at 663, 708 S.E.2d at 390-91.
Id. at 663-64, 708 S.E.2d at 391.

137.

555 U.S. 285 (2009).

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Alcorn, 308 Ga. App. at 664, 708 S.E.2d at 391.
Id. at 664 n.1, 708 S.E.2d at 391 n.1 (quoting Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 299 n.10).
Id. at 665, 708 S.E.2d at 392.
Id.
No. CV 609-081, 2010 WL 3282982 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 18, 2010).
Id. at *3.
Id. at *2.
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discovery will satisfy the good cause requirement." 4 s Here, the carrier
claimed that Zorn was still overstating the disability he was claiming;
hence, contemporaneous discovery and proof would go to this continuing
issue-"continuing disability.l 46 While the court noted the presumption to "try the case on paper," this set of ongoing facts met the
exception.1
Similarly, in Hall v. United of Omaha Life Insurance Co.,'"8 the
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia upheld the carrier's
right to a post administrative record independent medical exam (IME)
request.4 4 The claimant filed a long-term disability claim but was
notified that his benefits would be terminated because his mental health
benefits were limited to a maximum of twenty-four months. The
claimant then submitted an application for long-term disability benefits
based on physical impairment, but it was denied. The claimant's
resulting appeal contained four hundred pages of medical records. That
review led to a request for an IME by an orthopedic surgeon, which was
rejected by the claimant as untimely.1o The court reviewed the
Eleventh Circuit's requirement of exhausting administrative remedies
prior to suit but noted that there were exceptions when the exhaustion
requirement "would be an empty exercise in legal formalism."'' Here,
as a practical matter, the IME could not have been requested as a part
of the administrative presuit process given the manner in which the
claimant presented the appeal and proceeded to court. 5 2 Thus, the
district court ordered the claimant to undergo an IME at his insurer's
request. 53
VI.

LIFE INSURANCE

In a sequel to J.M.I.C. Life Insurance Co. v. Toole," 4 another credit
life/disability insurance company failed on all its arguments in Resource
In Buckner, the plaintiffs brought a

Life Insurance Co. v. Buckneri"

145. Id. at *4 (quoting Rubino v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 07 Civ. 377, 2009 WL 910747, at
*4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009)).
146. Id. at *5.
147. Id. at *6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. 741 F. Supp. 2d 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
149. Id. at 1354.
150. Id. at 1350-53.
151. Id. at 1353 (quoting Perrino v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 209 F.3d 1309, 1318 (11th
Cir. 2000)).
152. Id. at 1353-54.
153. Id. at 1359.
154. 280 Ga. App. 372, 634 S.E.2d 123 (2006).
155. 304 Ga. App. 719, 698 S.E.2d 19 (2010).
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certified class action lawsuit to secure refunds allegedly wrongfully
withheld by the carrier, Resource Life.1 6 Resource Life unsuccessfully
argued that it could require written notice prior to making refunds for
unearned premiums on policies terminated prior to the end of the
Due to discovery abuses involving the withholding of Loan
term."
Termination Dates, the trial court sanctioned, through a rebuttal
presumption, that all class members whom Resource Life could not prove
did receive a refund were presumed to have been terminated early and
owed a refund." This presented Resource Life a worst facts environment, in terms of dollar exposure. The court then rejected Resource
Life's argument that it could require prior written notice for early
termination.'"' The court reasoned that, generally, "a notice provision
in an insurance policy is not considered a condition precedent unless it
expressly states that a failure to provide such notice will result in a
forfeiture of the insured's rights .
In American General Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Johnson,"'
the District Court for the Middle District of Georgia found insufficient
proof of the minimum amount in controversy needed for diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction.'
Due to alleged material misrepresentations,
the carrier sought to rescind a $50,000 increase in the face amount of a
life insurance policy.'63 An amount in controversy exceeding $75,000
While
is presently required for federal diversity jurisdiction.'
echoing the weight of authority affording the inclusion of both the
alleged bad faith penalty (up to fifty percent) and reasonable attorney
fees as part of the amount in controversy, as provided by section 33-4-6
of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.),16 5 Judge Lawson
found that the pleadings and proof in this particular case evinced
insufficient proof of at least $75,000 in controversy.'
The court emphasized that the statutory bad faith penalty claim was
stated to be "as much as fifty percent (50%) of the denied benefit. . ."-that is, up to $25,000, rather than $25,000.'6' Additionally, the

156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 719, 698 S.E.2d at 22-23.
Id. at 726, 698 S.E.2d at 27.
Id.
Id. at 726-27, 698 S.E.2d at 27.

160. Id.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

No. 7:10-CV-00136(HL), 2011 WL 1336554 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 7, 2011).
Id. at *3.
Id, at *1.
28 U.S.C § 1332(a) (2006).
O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6 (Supp. 2011).
Johnson, 2011 WL 1336554, at *3.
Id. at *2.
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carrier provided no factual basis for the amount of reasonable attorney
fees, and the court would not speculate or presume any such
amount.'68 The court correctly noted that federal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction."' It is incumbent upon the party seeking to
establish diversity jurisdiction to present sufficient information
regarding the full amount in controversy requirement.no
VII. TITLE INSURANCE
Finally, there is a title insurance opinion of significant financial
import to the bar. In Fidelity National Title Insurance v. Keyingham
Investments, LLC,"' a unanimous Georgia Supreme Court, speaking
through Justice Nahmias, held that, for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 33-78,"' a forged deed equals a defective title.17 ' The court in Keyingham, relying upon an old court of appeals opinion, Glass v. Stewart Title
Guaranty Co., 7 4 argued that a forged deed that is void ab initio does
not create a property interest that title insurance can insure."'
Echoing the court of appeals opinion in this case, the supreme court held
that the insurer's argument "ignores that one of the very purposes of
title insurance is to protect a party from the consequences of forgery in
the chain of title . . . ."16 Hence, until and unless a title insurance

commitment plainly and explicitly excludes coverage for forgery,
defective title includes forged title."'
VIII.

A.

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE

Uninsured Motorist Coverage

1. "Thurman'sMarch to the Sea"' Halted at the Hospital. As
described in previous survey articles, since the Georgia Supreme Court's

168.
169.

Id. at *3.
Id. at *2.

170. Id. (quoting Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinnon Motors, LLC, 329 F.3d 805, 807
(11th Cir. 2003)).
171. 288 Ga. 312, 702 S.E.2d 851 (2010).
172. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-8 (2000).
173. Keyingham, 288 Ga. at 313, 702 S.E.2d at 853.
174. 181 Ga. App. 804, 354 S.E.2d 187 (1987).
175. Keyingham, 288 Ga. at 313, 702 S.E.2d at 852-53.
176. Id. at 313, 702 S.E.2d at 853 (quoting Keyingham Invs., LLC v. Fid. Nat'l Title
Ins. Co., 298 Ga. App. 467, 471, 680 S.E.2d 442, 445 (2009)).
177. Id. at 314, 702 S.E.2d at 853.
178. FRANK E. JENKINS III & WALLACE MILLER III, GEORGIA AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
LAW

§ 32:3(7)

(2009-2010 ed. 2009).
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decision in Thurman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.," 9 an uninsured motorist (UM) insurance carrier's exposure in any
given case may depend upon how the injured insured was insured for
medical coverage."'o In Thurman, the court held that the liability
insurer's payments to the injured party's federal workers' compensation
carrier and group health carrier were payments "of other claims or
otherwise" that reduced the liability limits available to the injured party,
increasing the injured party's UM carrier's exposure.' 8'
The court of appeals extended Thurman to a liability carrier's payment
of Medicare liens, in Toomer v. Allstate Insurance Co.,' " and to the
payment of hospital liens, in Adams v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co." In Floyd v. American International South Insurance
Co.,'" the court of appeals even extended Thurman to existing hospital
liens that had not yet been paid.8" Considering the potential future
expansion of Thurman to all manner of liens and subrogation claims, the
authors of Georgia Automobile Insurance Law coined the phrase
"Thurman's march to the sea" and wondered what lien, if any, would
withstand the offensive."
The answer came from the Georgia Supreme Court, which reversed both Adams and Floyd in two opinions
authored by Justice Melton during this survey period."'
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Adams," the
supreme court reversed the court of appeals and held that a liability
carrier's payment of a hospital lien did not reduce the limits of liability
coverage available to pay the claim of the injured party."
State
Farm's insured was involved in an automobile accident and subsequently
brought suit against the tortfeasor, who was insured with Nationwide.
Nationwide and the insured settled for the liability policy limit of
$25,000. Of that amount, $9,217.66 was paid to Grady Memorial

179. 278 Ga. 162, 598 S.E.2d 448 (2004).
180. See Cotter et al., supra note 1, at 148-50; Wolff et al., Insurance,Annual Survey
of Georgia Law, 61 MERCER L. REV. 179, 184 (2009).
181. Thurman, 278 Ga. at 163, 598 S.E.2d at 450; O.C.G.A.
(Supp. 2011).

§ 33-7-11(b)(1)(D)(ii)(I)

182. 292 Ga. App. 60, 63, 663 S.E.2d 763, 765-66 (2008).
183. 298 Ga. App. 249, 253, 679 S.E.2d 726, 729 (2009), rev'd, 288 Ga. 315, 702 S.E.2d
898 (2010).
184. 298 Ga. App. 771, 681 S.E.2d 216 (2009), rev'd, 288 Ga. 322, 704 S.E.2d 755
(2010).

185.

Id. at 773, 681 S.E.2d at 218.

186. JENKINS & MILLER, supra note 178.
187. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Adams, 288 Ga. 315, 320, 702 S.E.2d 898,
902 (2010); Am. Int'1 S. Ins. Co. v. Floyd, 288 Ga. 322, 323, 704 S.E.2d 755, 755-56 (2010).
188. 288 Ga. 315, 702 S.E.2d 898 (2010).
189. Id. at 320, 702 S.E.2d at 902.
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Hospital to satisfy its lien. The insured had $100,000 UM coverage with
State Farm. State Farm paid $75,000 and claimed a credit for the
$25,000 paid by Nationwide. The case then centered on whether
Nationwide's payment of the Grady Hospital lien reduced the coverage
available to satisfy the insured's claim. The trial court granted
summary judgment to State Farm, and the insured appealed. The court
of appeals reversed, holding that State Farm was not entitled to a credit
pursuant to the rationale of Thurman.9 o
The supreme court considered both the "bedrock principles" of
uninsured motorist coverage and the "fundamental nature" of a hospital
lien in conducting its analysis."' The purpose of the uninsured
motorist statute, the court held, "is to place the injured insured in the
same position as if the offending uninsured motorist were covered with
liability insurance.""' A hospital lien "allows the hospital to step into
the shoes of the insured for purposes of receiving payment from the
tortfeasor's insurance company for economic damages represented by the
hospital bill."' The existence of the lien does not create a new cause
of action against the tortfeasor or the liability insurer.'
Therefore, the court held that a liability carrier's payment of a
hospital lien is a payment of a portion of the injured party's economic
damages and not payment of "other claims or otherwise" under O.C.G.A.
§ 33-7-11(bX1)(DXiiXI).9' The lien "is merely a part of [the injured
party's] claim, and its payment represents partial satisfaction of [that]
claim."" The court distinguished Thurman on the grounds that no
subrogation rights of another insurer are involved when a hospital bill
has gone unpaid-and, thus, the full compensation rule is inapplicable-and because the federal statutes at issue in Thurman made
reimbursement by the tortfeasor's insurer mandatory, whereas the
hospital lien in Adams attached to, and became part of, the injured
party's cause of action.'
In American International South Insurance Co. v. Floyd,'" the
supreme court adopted its contemporaneous decision in Adams and held

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 315, 702 S.E.2d at 899-900.
Id. at 315, 702 S.E.2d at 900.
Id. at 316, 702 S.E.2d at 900.
Id. at 318, 702 S.E.2d at 901.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); O.C.G.A.
288 Ga. at 318, 702 S.E.2d at 901.
Id. at 317 & n.1, 702 S.E.2d at 900 & n.1.
288 Ga. 322, 704 S.E.2d 755 (2010).
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that it likewise applies to a hospital lien that has not been paid by the
tortfeasor's liability insurer."'9

2. Alphabet Soup - What do GIRMA and CICA have to say
about UM? Two cases decided during the survey period involved
conflicts between the requirement that UM coverage be offered and
included in every motor vehicle insurance policy unless rejected by the
insured and another Georgia statute affecting the carrier or insured.
Diverging decisions resulted.
The Uninsured Motorist Act,20 0 requires every motor vehicle insurance policy "issued or delivered in this state" to include a minimum
amount of UM coverage, unless the insured rejects such coverage in
writing.20 ' The Georgia Interlocal Risk Management Agency (GIRMA)
operates a self-insurance program authorized by statute for municipalities and counties.20 2 Georgia municipalities are entitled to sovereign
immunity except in limited circumstances including where a municipality has purchased insurance to cover a loss, but only to the extent of the
insurance coverage.20 3
The city of Newnan participates in GIRMA. The GIRMA contract
provides the statutory minimum amount of uninsured motorist coverage,
but it does not provide underinsured motorist coverage or allow covered
individuals the option of selecting additional coverage.204 In Georgia
Interlocal Risk Management Agency v. Godfrey,2 05 the court of appeals
held that requiring GIRMA to provide underinsured coverage would run
afoul of Newnan's sovereign immunity and that municipalities have the
discretion to decide what coverage they offer.20 s
Daniel Godfrey, a Newnan police officer, was struck and injured by a
motor vehicle with minimum liability limits. Godfrey and his wife sued
the tortfeasor and served GIRMA with their complaint as an uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier.
GIRMA filed a declaratory
judgment action, asserting it had no obligation to provide underinsured
motorist benefits because its contract did not provide such benefits and

199. Id. at 323, 704 S.E.2d at 755-56.
200. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 (2011).
201. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(aX1), (3).
202. O.C.G.A. § 36-85-1(7) (2006).
203. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 9; O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) (2005); O.C.G.A. § 36-922(b) (2006).
204. Ga. Interlocal Risk Mgmt. Agency v. Godfrey, 305 Ga. App. 130, 131, 699 S.E.2d
377, 377-78 (2010).
205. 305 Ga. App. 130, 699 S.E.2d 377 (2010).
206. Id. at 133-34, 699 S.E.2d at 379.
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was not required to provide them. 20' The trial court granted summary
judgment to the Godfreys, holding the O.C.G.A. § 33-7-1120' applied
because GIRMA was the equivalent of an insurance company. 209
The court of appeals reversed, holding that, because the municipality
was not required to purchase any insurance covering its motor vehicles
it thus enjoyed sovereign immunity except to the extent of coverage it
elected to purchase, and that the municipality had the discretion to
decide what coverage it would offer.2 10 In addition, the court found it
significant that the insurance commissioner reviewed and approved the
GIRMA plan, and the commissioner was given the sole authority to
determine whether the plan complied with the requirements of the
statute and the regulations.2 11
The requirement of the Uninsured Motorist Act that every motor
vehicle insurance policy "issued or delivered in this state" must include
UM coverage, unless rejected by the insured in writing, appears to apply
to all policies of motor vehicle insurance.2 12 However, the Georgia
Captive Insurance Company Act (CICA)213 restricts captive insurers
from insuring against certain risks, including those resulting from "[a]ny
personal, familial, or household responsibilities" and those which do not
result from the insured's business. 214 These statutes potentially
conflict because the UM statute defines "insured" to include members of
the policyholder's household, whether injured in a vehicle or other215
wise.
Whether this potential conflict prohibits a captive insurer
from offering UM coverage was a question of first impression answered
by the court of appeals in VFH Captive Insurance Co. v. Pleitez.216
Pleitez was a taxi cab driver who was struck and seriously injured by
another vehicle while changing a tire on 1-85. Pleitez received the policy
limits from the other driver's insurance company and sought UM
benefits from his insurer. The insurer, VFH Captive Insurance
Company, insures only vehicles for hire. VFH denied that the policy
included UM coverage and argued that it was prohibited from offering
UM because of the limitations imposed by CICA."

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 131, 699 S.E.2d at 377-78.
O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 (2000).
Godfrey, 305 Ga. App. at 131, 699 S.E.2d at 378.
Id. at 134, 699 S.E.2d at 379.
Id. at 133-34, 699 S.E.2d at 379.
See O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(1), (3).
O.C.G.A. tit. 33, ch. 41 (2005 & Supp. 2011).
O.C.G.A. § 33-41-3(cXl)(A)-(B).
O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(bX1XB).
307 Ga. App. 240, 704 S.E.2d 476 (2010).
Id. at 240, 704 S.E.2d at 477.
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The court of appeals found no direct conflict in the statutes because
nothing in CICA expressly prohibits captive insurers from offering
To the contrary, CICA requires
uninsured motorist coverage.21
in conformity with all minimum
to
"be
insurers
captive
by
issued
policies
amounts established by the
and
coverage
requirements for coverages
state . . . ."21

However, the court noted that portions of the Uninsured

Motorist Act may, in fact, be inconsistent with the CICA: "[To the extent
the uninsured motorist provisions are inconsistent with CICA, those
provisions would not apply to captive insurance companies ...

22

The case before the court dealt with a taxi driver who was injured while
on the job, and, thus, did not implicate the conflicting CICA restrictions. 221 Because Pleitez never rejected UM coverage, the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment and held
that he was entitled to UM coverage.222
3. Rejection of UM Can Be Done by an Agent of the Insured. As
stated previously, O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 requires UM coverage in every
motor vehicle insurance policy except "where any insured named in the
policy shall reject the coverage in writing."2 23 The question raised in
Ace American Insurance Co. v. Townsend 224 was whether an effective
rejection could be made by someone other than a named insured and in
a manner other than by the selection/rejection form provided by the
insurer with the policy. 225 The District Court for the Southern District
of Georgia found that a broker, acting as an agent of the named insured,
could affect a rejection of UM coverage on the insured's behalf when
submitting proposals for coverage to potential carriers. 22 6
In 2007, SABIC Innovative Plastics (SABIC) hired Richard Inserra as
a consultant to assist it in selecting and purchasing several policies,
including general liability, automobile liability, and workers' compensation. Based on Inserra's recommendation, SABIC engaged a broker,
Marsh, to obtain insurance proposals from various carriers. Marsh
requested a proposal from Ace American Insurance Co. (Ace American)

218. Id. at 242, 704 S.E.2d at 478.
219. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); O.C.G.A. § 33-41-3(b).
220. Pleitez, 307 Ga. App. at 242, 704 S.E.2d at 479. The court cited Godfrey, for the
proposition that other statutes may restrict the otherwise universal application of the
uninsured motorist act. Id. (citing Godfrey, 305 Ga. App. at 132-33,699 S.E.2d at 378-79).
221. Id. at 243, 704 S.E.2d at 479.
222. Id.
223. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(3).
224. No. CV409-101, 2011 WL 3348378 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 2011).
225. Id. at *2-3.
226. Id. at *4.

188

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

and stated in the proposal that SABIC intended to reject UM coverage.
Ace American made a proposal that did not include uninsured motorist
coverage. SABIC purchased its insurance from Ace American, and the
final policy did not include uninsured motorist coverage. 227
When it issued the policy, Ace American sent SABIC forms for the
selection or rejection of UM coverage. SABIC's treasurer had Mr.
Inserra complete the forms and indicate on the forms that SABIC was
rejecting the coverage. The forms were signed by the treasurer. One
form was mailed to Marsh, the other to Ace American. The form mailed
to Marsh indicated that uninsured motorist coverage was rejected, but
the form mailed to Ace American neither selected nor rejected UM
coverage.228
Sometime thereafter, a SABIC employee, Townsend, died as a result
of an automobile accident. The employee's wife requested payment of
uninsured motorist coverage under the SABIC policy, but Ace American
denied coverage on the ground that SABIC had rejected UM coverage
when it purchased the policy. Townsend's wife filed a suit for damages,
and Ace American filed a declaratory judgment action.229
In the declaratory judgment action, the parties filed cross motions for
summary judgment.230 The court, relying on American Liberty Insurance Co. v. Sanders,231 first noted that a rejection of UM coverage
contained in an application for insurance is an effective rejection under
the statute.23 2 Ace American argued that Marsh's submission on
SABIC's behalf, seeking a proposal from Ace American, contained a
rejection of UM coverage.2 33 Against Mrs. Townsend's argument that
Marsh's submission was "nothing more than a request for a conditional
insurance quote[,]" the court stated that "the focus [should be] less on
the name of the document and more on the purpose of the document."23' The court found that the submission from Marsh to Ace
American seeking a policy proposal was the equivalent of an application
for insurance, which amounted to a rejection of UM coverage because the
submission was made for the purpose of inducing Ace American to issue
SABIC a policy. 235

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
120 Ga. App. 1, 169 S.E.2d 342 (1969).
Townsend, 2011 WL 3348378, at *3.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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Additionally, the court stated that the rejection does not have to be
made by the insured itself if an agent of the insured has made the
rejection; thus, Marsh, as an independent broker, effectively rejected UM
coverage on behalf of SABIC.23 6 The court therefore granted summary
judgment in favor of Ace American.2 37
4. Insured's Failure to Give Notice of Accident Dooms Claim
Even Though the Carrierwas Notified by Another Insured in the
Same Accident. When an automobile insurance policy provides that
the insured "must give us or one of our agents written notice of the
accident or loss as soon as reasonably possible,",3 ' and the insured
fails to give the insurer any notice of the loss, may the insurer assert the
insured's failure to give notice as a basis for denying UM benefits even
though the insured knew of the accident via another party to the
accident? The court of appeals answered in the affirmative in Lankford
v. State Farm.2 9
Bobby Lee Lankford was involved in an automobile collision with
Charles Kaucky. Both individuals were insured with State Farm. Three
days after the accident, Lankford received a letter from a State Farm
claims representative referencing Kaucky's policy and the accident. One
month later, Lankford's employer sent State Farm a letter indicating
that it would seek a subrogation recovery for the workers' compensation
benefits paid to Lankford and that Lankford's treatment was ongoing.
Five months later, Lankford's attorney sought disclosure of Kaucky's
policy limits from State Farm. Lankford later discussed his injuries and
the workers' compensation claim with his State Farm agent and
contended he was never told he needed to give that information in
writing.240
Almost two years after the accident, Lankford filed suit and his
attorney sent a copy of the complaint to State Farm with a letter.24 '
State Farm was served with the complaint and moved for summary
judgment on the ground that Lankford failed to provide notice "as soon
The notice provision was
as reasonably possible" after the accident.
made a condition of recovery against State Farm by the policy language
that stated "[there is no right of action against [State Farm] . . . until

236. Id. at *4.
237. Id.
238. See Lankford v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 307 Ga. App. 12, 13, 703 S.E.2d 436,
438 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
239. 307 Ga. App. 12, 15-16, 703 S.E.2d 436, 440 (2010).
240. Id. at 12-13, 703 S.E.2d at 438.
241. Id. at 13, 703 S.E.2d at 438.
242. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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all the terms of this policy have been met."24 3 The trial court granted
State Farm's motion.244
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the policy language
required the insured to provide notice "'as soon as reasonably possible'
after the accident"-not when the tortfeasor's coverage was exhausted or
when the insured perceived his own UM policies may be called upon for
compensation. 245 The failure to provide that notice for two years after
an accident is an unreasonable delay as a matter of law. 246
Although it was undisputed that Lankford did not provide written
notice of the accident for two years, it was also undisputed that State
Farm was fully aware of the accident and that Lankford was injured. 24 7 However, the court held that notification of the incident by
an unrelated third party referencing a different policy did not relieve
Lankford of his own individual obligation, under his separate policy, to
notify the insurer.24 8 Further, the court stated that no authority
requires the insurer to cross-reference all parties to an accident and
determine if an injured party may be its insured.24 9
B.

Issues in Liability Coverage

1. Updates on Previously Reported Cases. In Sapp v. Canal
Insurance Co. ,25 the court of appeals held that a "Limitation of Use"
endorsement that limited the insurance policy's coverage to use of the
insured vehicle within a fifty-mile radius of the insured's location was
valid and enforceable.2 1 1 The Georgia Supreme Court granted the
injured parties' petition for writ of certiorari and reversed.252
In this declaratory judgment action, Canal Insurance Co. (Canal)
sought a declaration that an accident involving its insured's dump truck
was not covered under the policy because the policy Canal issued had a
fifty-mile radius-of-use limitation and the accident occurred outside of
the fifty-mile radius. On cross-motions for summary judgment filed by
Canal and the tort suit plaintiffs, the trial court granted Canal's motion
243. Id. at 14, 703 S.E.2d at 438 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
244. Id. at 12, 703 S.E.2d at 437-38.
245. Id. at 14, 703 S.E.2d at 439.
246. Id. at 15, 703 S.E.2d at 439 (citing Royer v. Murphy, 277 Ga. App. 150, 151, 625
S.E.2d 544, 545 (2006)).
247. Id. at 15, 703 S.E.2d at 439-40.
248. Id. at 15-16, 703 S.E.2d at 440.
249. Id. at 16, 703 S.E.2d at 440.
250. 301 Ga. App. 596, 688 S.E.2d 375 (2009).
251. Id. at 597-98, 688 S.E.2d at 376-77. See also Cotter et al., supra note 1, at 157.
252. Sapp v. Canal, 288 Ga. 681, 681, 706 S.E.2d 644, 646 (2011).
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and dismissed all claims against it. The court of appeals affirmed and
held that Canal's policy was a basic automobile insurance policy, and
thus, the radius-of-use limitation was valid."
On certiorari, the supreme court held that the Georgia Motor Carrier
Act2 54 applied; therefore, the radius-of-use limitation was invalid.2 55
The court of appeals based its holding on the fact that the insured
trucking company had never obtained a motor carrier permit and that
there was no "Form F" endorsement to the policy.2 56
The supreme court held that these facts were not dispositive.s?
Rather, it relied on the fact that the insured operated a dump truck
business, hauling materials for others for compensation, thereby meeting
the statutory definition of a motor carrier.2 58 Furthermore, at the time
Canal issued the policy, Canal was aware of the facts upon which the
insured's status as a carrier was determined, and the insured identified
itself on the application as a "common carrier."25 9 Considering the
public policy behind the Motor Carrier Act, protection of the public, the
court held that the failure to comply with regulatory requirements
should not insulate the insurer from liability, and any negative
consequences that stem from noncompliance should fall on one or both
of the noncompliant parties. 26 0 Thus, the radius-of-use limitation was
invalidated, and "Canal [was] subject to liability up to the policy limit
3261

In State Auto Property & Casualty Co. v. Matty,2 62 a declaratory
judgment action concerned an incident in which the insured's vehicle
struck two bicyclists-the question was whether there was one accident,
or two. 26 3 Answering a certified question from the federal district
court, the Georgia Supreme Court held that a jury question existed as
to the number of accidents involved.264
In an opinion by Judge Clay Land of the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia, the court reported that a jury trial

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id.
O.C.G.A. tit. 46, ch. 7 (2004 & Supp. 2011).
Sapp, 288 Ga. at 681, 706 S.E.2d at 646.
Sapp, 301 Ga. App. at 597-98, 688 S.E.2d at 377.
Sapp, 288 Ga. at 681-82, 706 S.E.2d at 646.
Id. at 682, 706 S.E.2d at 647; see also O.C.G.A. § 46-1-1(9)(A) (Supp. 2011).
Sapp, 288 Ga. at 684, 706 S.E.2d at 648 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 685, 706 S.E.2d at 648-49.
Id. at 686, 706 S.E.2d at 649.
286 Ga. 611, 690 S.E.2d 614 (2010).
Id. at 611, 690 S.E.2d at 616.
Id. at 617, 690 S.E.2d at 619; see also Cotter et al., supra note 1, at 152.
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65
Judge
was held and that the jury found two accidents occurred.2
Land denied the insurer's motions for judgment as a matter of law and
alternative motion for a new trial, finding sufficient evidentiary basis for
the verdict and that the verdict was not contrary to the clear weight of
the evidence.2 "

2. Rental Agency May Enforce Contract Exclusion and Avoid
Liability as a Self-Insurer. As a matter of first impression, the
Georgia Court of Appeals considered whether "a plaintiff in a garnishment action [can] recover insurance proceeds from a self-insured car
rental agency when the defendant renter was driving in violation of the
rental agreement when he caused the accident[]"2 67 In Hix v. Hertz
Corp.,2 " the court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the renter/driver's violation of the rental agreement amounted to an exclusion
of coverage, and the injured party could not recover a portion of the
judgment obtained against the renter from the self-insured renter.2
Carson Bolt rented an SUV from Hertz. While driving the rented
vehicle, Bolt was involved in a high-speed chase in which he was fleeing
the police and driving under the influence of drugs. Bolt collided with
Hix's vehicle, thereby injuring Hix and killing his wife. Hix sued Bolt
and obtained a $5.1 million consent judgment. Bolt was insured by
Progressive Insurance Company, which paid its $200,000 policy limit to
Hix. Hix then filed a garnishment action against Hertz in which he
sought to recover the remainder of his judgment from Hertz's $10 million
self-insurance plan. Hertz contended that, in driving in violation of
various criminal laws, Bolt violated the rental agreement and was
thereby excluded from coverage under Hertz's plan.270
The court stated that exclusions in insurance policies are generally
enforceable unless they violate public policy and noted three public
interests that control exclusions: "(1) as insureds, to limit the insurer's
risks and thereby keep automobile insurance premiums as low as
possible; (2) as members of the public in general to improve safety on the
highways; and (3) as accident victims, to have access to insurance funds
to satisfy their judgments."27 ' The court noted that, while public policy

265. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Matty, No. 4:08-CV-98(CDC), 2010 WL 5463088,
at *1 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 29, 2010).
266. Id. at *2.
267. Hix v. Hertz Corp., 307 Ga. App. 369, 369, 705 S.E.2d 219, 220 (2010).
268. 307 Ga. App. 369, 705 S.E.2d 219 (2010).
269. Id. at 369-70, 705 S.E.2d at 220-21.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 371, 705 S.E.2d at 221-22 (quoting Fla. Int'l Indem. Co. v. Guest, 219 Ga.
App. 222, 225, 464 S.E.2d 847, 850 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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favors compensating Hix and his wife as innocent victims of a car
accident, a series of Georgia decisions have upheld policy exclusions
when they do not result in the injured party receiving less than the
statutory minimum amount of liability insurance.272 Because Hix
received compensation in excess of the amount required by O.C.G.A.
§ 33-7-11(aX1), the court held the exclusion of Bolt from Hertz's selfinsurance would not violate public policy. 7 3 Because Bolt himself is
not entitled to Hertz's coverage, Hix, who is essentially standing in Bolt's
shoes as a garnishor, is thereby not entitled to compensation from
Hertz's self-insurance plan.
3. Permissive Use and "Second Permittee" Cases. The "second
permittee" doctrine provides that "the permission to use contained in an
omnibus clause refers to the purpose for which permission was given and
not to the operation of the vehicle.",7 1 Where an employee of a car
dealership considered buying a car, took the car home for a weekend test
drive, and then allowed a friend to drive the vehicle to show it to a girl,
the friend was not a second permittee and, therefore, was not entitled to
coverage under the dealership's liability coverage for a collision he
caused while driving the borrowed vehicle. 7

In the case of Conklin v. Acceptance Indemnity Insurance Co., 2 77
Century Car Corporation (Century), a used car dealer, insured all its
vehicles with a policy issued by Acceptance Indemnity Insurance
Company (Acceptance). The policy provided coverage up to $1 million for
employees or permissive users and coverage up to $25,000 if a customer
was operating the vehicle. Michael Mincey was an employee of Century.
Mincey was interested in buying one of Century's vehicles so he took the
vehicle home for the weekend to test drive. Mincey allowed a friend,
Chapman, to drive the vehicle and show it to a girl. Chapman had no
intention of purchasing the vehicle. While driving the vehicle, Chapman
was involved in an accident.27 8
Acceptance filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking a determination that its policy did not provide coverage to Chapman because, as he
had no intentions of purchasing the vehicle, he was not a second

272. Id. at 371-72, 705 S.E.2d at 222.
273. Id. at 372, 705 S.E.2d at 222.
274. Id. at 374, 705 S.E.2d at 223.
275. Conklin v. Acceptance Indem. Ins. Co., 306 Ga. App. 585, 588, 702 S.E.2d 727, 730
(2010) (quoting Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 190 Ga. App. 593, 594,
379 S.E.2d 619, 620 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
276. Id. at 586, 589, 702 S.E.2d at 728-30.
277. 306 Ga. App. 585, 702 S.E.2d 727 (2010).
278. Id. at 586, 702 S.E.2d at 728-29.
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permittee nor a customer. The trial court granted Acceptance partial
summary judgment, finding that a jury question remained as to whether
Chapman was a second permittee, but also finding that Acceptance's
coverage was limited to $25,000.2'9 The court of appeals reversed. 280
The second permittee doctrine allows the permission to use the vehicle
given from the owner to the first permittee to be extended to a third
person who is allowed to use the vehicle by the first permittee when "the
owner's permission to the first permittee included the use to which the
third person put the car."281 Here, although there was no question
that Chapman had actual permission from Mincey to drive the vehicle
and Mincey had permission from Century, the court held Chapman could
not be an insured second permittee because his use of the vehicle fell
outside the scope of permission given by Century to Mincey, which was
limited to a test drive for the purpose of evaluating the vehicle for
purchase.28 2 Therefore, Chapman was not a second permittee nor an
insured under the policy.283
When an adult daughter borrows her mother's car for the restricted
purpose of driving to her own home and then to work the next morning,
and the daughter's boyfriend then takes the vehicle without the
daughter's knowledge and allows his cousin to drive the vehicle from a
nightclub, the boyfriend's cousin is not insured under the owner's
insurance policy because the boyfriend and the cousin are not permissive
users of the vehicle as defined in the policy nor covered as second
permitees.284
In Clayton v. Southern General Insurance Co., 285 Gynetha Wooten
insured a vehicle with Southern General Insurance Company (Southern
General). When Ms. Wooten's daughter, Latoya Wooten, asked to borrow
her mother's vehicle, Gynetha made clear that Latoya was only to drive
the vehicle back to her own home and then to work the next morning.
Latoya had several people at her house that evening. After Latoya went
to sleep, her boyfriend, Wayne Neal, took Gynetha's car, unbeknownst
to Latoya, and picked up his cousin. Neal and his cousin then drove to
a nightclub, and on their way home, while the cousin was driving, they
were involved in a collision. Passengers in the other car were injured.
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Gynetha's insurance company sought a declaratory judgment that its
policy excluded liability coverage for the collision because Neal and his
cousin did not qualify as permissive users of the insured car. The trial
court granted Southern General summary judgment.28 6
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment, holding the evidence
undisputed that Gynetha gave Latoya limited permission to use the
vehicle, which did not include allowing others to drive the vehicle, and
that neither Neal nor his cousin received permission to use the vehicle
from Gynetha or Latoya Wooten. 287 On the undisputed facts, the court
held it was clear that Neal and his cousin did not have a reasonable
belief they were entitled to use the vehicle; but even if they did, they
would not be covered because their use of the vehicle was outside the
scope of permission given by Gynetha to Latoya, such that neither could
have implied permission as a second permittee. 2 88 The court also held
that the fact that Latoya Wooten did not report her mother's car stolen
did not create a question of fact as to whether or not Neal and his cousin
had permission to use the vehicle.2 89
4. "Regular Use" Exclusion Enforced. A common feature of
automobile liability insurance policies is an exclusion for the regular use
of a vehicle that is not insured under the policy. In State Automobile
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Todd,290 the policy excluded "[a]ny vehicle,
other than 'your covered auto,' which is: a. owned by you, or b.
furnished or available for your regular use."'
Finding the evidence
established that the insured regularly used her friend's vehicle as a
matter of law, the court of appeals reversed a trial court's ruling that
denied summary judgment to the insurer in this declaratory judgment
action.29 2
The insured, Elizabeth Ann Todd, was involved in an automobile
accident with another person's vehicle. Todd was driving her friend's
vehicle at the time of the accident. Todd and the other driver were sued
by a passenger in the other vehicle. Todd's insurance carrier brought a
declaratory judgment action arguing that Todd's regular use of her
friend's vehicle excluded coverage under its policy.9
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Id. at 395, 702 S.E.2d at 448.
Id. at 397-98, 702 S.E.2d at 449-50.
Id.
Id. at 398, 702 S.E.2d at 450.
309 Ga. App. 213, 709 S.E.2d 565 (2011).
Id. at 214, 709 S.E.2d at 566 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The facts, as established by Todd's testimony, were that she had
borrowed a friend's vehicle to go on vacation and was driving back from
vacation when the collision occurred. Todd testified that her friend could
not drive, so she also used the car to run errands for her friend. Todd
had her own set of keys to the vehicle. Todd also stated that she would
park the car at her home and that, while she did not use the car on a
daily basis, she did use it regularly.2 94
The court of appeals held Todd's policy barred coverage on the basis
that, as a matter of law, she was more than just an incidental user of
the vehicle-the vehicle was available for Todd's regular use."
Because Todd's use was not "occasional, incidental, casual or infrequent,"
the court held it was error for the trial court to deny the insurer's
motion for summary judgment."'
This case evaluated the "regular use" exclusion of an insurance
policy.2 97 The court strictly adhered to the language of the policy
itself, holding that if an insured is regularly using a vehicle not covered
by the policy and the policy contains a regular use exclusion, coverage
is barred.29 8

294. Id. at 214, 709 S.E.2d at 566.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 215, 709 S.E.2d at 567 (internal quotation marks omitted).
297. Id. at 214-15, 709 S.E.2d at 566.
298. Id.

